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Pushing Drugs: Genomics and Genetics, the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, and the 
Law of Negligence 
Heidi Li Feldman * 
Chris Rock: They got AIDS out there. You think they gonna cure 
AIDS? No. They can't even cure athlete's foot. They ain't gonna 
cure AIDS. They ain't never curing AIDS. Ain't no money in cur-
ing it. The money's in the medicine. That's how you get paid. Sick 
people. That's how you fuckin' get paid. Coming back and back ... 
fucking cure AIDS. Ha! Curing AIDS! That's like Cadillac mak-
ing a car that lasts for fifty years. They ain't gonna do that. Ain't 
no money in that. And you know they can do it. They got metal on 
the space shuttle that can go around the moon and withstand tem-
peratures of up to fifteen thousand degrees. You mean to tell me 
you don't think they could make a Cadillac where the fucking 
bumper don't fall off. They can but they won't. So what they will 
do with AIDS - same thing they do with everything else - they 
will figure out a way for you to live with it. That's right. And they 
don't cure shit, they just patch it up. So what they will do, they will 
figure out a way for you to live with it. l 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Like any good satirist, Chris Rock takes the ideas of planned ob-
solescence and disease control, rather than cure, to their extremes. 
But again, as with any good satire, Rock's riff has seeds of truth. In 
this paper, I cultivate two of these seeds: the idea that for a long time 
pharmaceutical companies have indeed relied for their profitability on 
drugs that control, not cure, medical conditions, and the notion that 
there is a rapidly decreasing difference between a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer and an automobile maker (or, for that matter, any other 
large producer of consumer goods). Unlike Rock, though, I think the 
* J.D., Ph.D. (philosophy), University of Michigan; Professor of Law, Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center. The author thanks the students, faculty, and guests at the Ahrens Tort 
Symposium, where an early version of this paper was presented, for their attention, comments, 
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have been a more congenial incubator for the arguments presented here. Special thanks to 
Charlene Smith, William Rich, Roger Brownsword, and David Partlett for more extended dis-
cussion and comments. Thanks also to members of the Washington and Lee Law School faculty 
and members of Georgetown University Law Center faculty, who attended workshops in which 
the author presented a paper related to this one. Specific thanks to Steve Salop, Robin West, 
Alex Aleinikoff, Joe Page, Mike Gottesman, Blake Moran, and Colleen P. Murphy. I would also 
like to thank Blayne Miley, who is largely responsible for the cite checking on the "A Case Study 
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science, law, and business of pharmaceuticals will push drug manufac-
turers to develop and merchandise drugs that may cure, by influencing 
disease at the level of genetics. Whether this push will produce net 
social benefit depends upon how riskily pharmaceutical companies 
merchandise a coming generation of gene-tailored drug therapies. 
This article presents a piece of a larger, ongoing project on the 
phenomenon of market-driven manufacturing (MDM) and how tort 
law should address it.2 In contrast to the larger project, this article 
provides a relatively brief overview of the general phenomenon of 
MDM, but zeros in on how pharmaceutical manufacturers specifically 
practice MDM. MDM is a well-documented, much practiced activity,3 
although American courts do not recognize MDM as a discrete cate-
gory of conduct.4 The basic idea of MDM is that marketing considera-
tions should continuously control every aspect and stage of a 
product's lifecycle.5 When a company engages in MDM, it completely 
inverts the conception of product design, development, and dissemi-
nation that seems natural to those unfamiliar with modern producer 
practices. Somebody thinking rather loosely about products manufac-
turing might well think the process goes as follows. A person or group 
of people notice a need or desire other people seem to have and envi-
2. See Heidi Li Feldman, Market-Driven Manufacturing, and Its Challenges for Tort Law: 
Climates of Risk and the Law of Negligence (forthcoming 2004). 
3. Companies use MDM for all sorts of products. For example, in the early 1990s Lever 
Brothers Company decided to launch a new soap, notwithstanding already stiff competition in 
the market for bar soaps. ROBERT J. THOMAS, NEW PRODUcr SUCCESS STORIES: LESSONS 
FROM LEADING INNOVATORS 220, 221 (1995). Despite strong competition from rival products, 
Lever 2000 became the third largest selling bar soap only one year after its launch. Id. at 220. 
One business analyst attributes this success to the "strategy-driven marketing research and tech-
nical product development by [Lever]," the close working relationship between Lever and its 
advertising agency in the research and development stage of Lever 2000, and a "highly inte-
grated marketing program." Id. at 226-27. According to Thomas, the positioning of Lever 2000 
as "healthy skin care for the whole family" was delivered through a technically superior product 
design, the "2,000 body parts" advertising campaign, an effectively designed high tech package, a 
bar design that was soft and rounded to the touch, heavy sampling to induce trial, heavy coupon-
ing to offer value and build repeat purchase, and intensive distribution. The marketing program 
produced the desired consumer response and led to market success. Id. at 227. 
4. MDM resembles other potentially tortious acts, in that it can be performed either negli-
gently or non-negligently. We can compare MDM to driving. Driving is a collection of acts that, 
for tort purposes, are understood as integrated conduct (nobody files claims for negligent steer-
ing or negligent checking-the-rearview-mirror). It makes sense to understand driving at a cer· 
tain level of generality, the level at which the integrated acts together potentially pose excessive 
risk. So, too, with MDM: its components, which can be conceptually distinguished from one 
another, should, from a tort perspective, be understood at a higher level of generality, as a non-
coincidentally integrated set of acts with the potential to create inappropriate risk. Just as driv-
ers can act negligently or non-negligently, so too can practitioners of MDM. In both cases, it 
depends on whether they act as a reasonable person of ordinary prudence and caution, with due 
regard for the safety of others, would act in similar circumstances. 
5. As early as 1971, two authors coined the term "social marketing" and defined it as "the 
design, implementation and control of programs calculated to influence the acceptability of so-
cial ideas and involving considerations of product planning, pricing, communication, distribution, 
and marketing research." Shelby D. Hunt, The Nature and Scope of Marketing, in PROMO-
TIONAL MANAGEMENT: ISSUES AND PERSPEcrIvES 2, 3 (Norman Govoni et al. eds., 1988) (quot-
ing Philip Kotlar & Gerald Zaltman, Social Marketing: An Approach to Planned Social Change, 
35 J. MARKETING 5 (1971». 
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sion a product that would fulfill the need or gratify the desire. These 
people then invent that product and manufacture it. The inventors/ 
manufacturers then turn to other people to get their product into a 
distribution chain - wholesaler to jobber to sales representatives to 
retailers, for example. The retailers sell the product to the ordinary 
consumer. 
MDM essentially turns this simple picture upside down. A mod-
ern corporation often starts by fanning or instilling desires or needs in 
the general population, thereby stimulating or creating demand for a 
product the company has not yet fully envisioned.6 Only after devel-
opment of demand does the company invest in design, tailoring its 
product to the now-felt needs and desires that the company itself has 
promoted.? 
In addition to developing demand before producing product, a 
company engaged in MDM does not hold itself at the distance from 
the ultimate consumer envisioned by the unreflective picture of manu-
facturing.8 Modern companies often gain information about consum-
ers and adapt consumers' needs and desires by working very closely 
with retailers - the people closest to those who will actually buy 
products. Furthermore, practitioners of MDM exercise careful con-
trol over wholesalers and retailers, trading availability of their product 
in exchange for information about end users and opportunities to pro-
mote directly to them. The unreflective take on manufacturing pic-
tures it acontextually, most notably ignoring the way in which MDM 
includes influencing the political process and legal system,9 at all 
levels, to make it easier to create and stimulate demand and to avoid 
consequences of creating risks leading to injury. Practitioners of 
MDM organize the process of MDM from the top down, often hiring 
full service public relations consultants to coordinate and integrate all 
aspects of MDM.lO 
This article explores the relationship between pharmaceutical 
MDM and the fledgling field of pharmacogenomics - the develop-
ment of drugs based on the explosion of basic research into the human 
genome and human genetics in the past thirty years. This basic re-
search is just that - basic - yet it is also regarded as the most fertile 
ground for developing drugs to cure or prevent ailments and condi-
6. The need for MDM grew as American producers saturated the market with "obviously" 
desirable consumer goods. See WILLIAM LEACH, LAND OF DESIRE: MERCHANTS, POWER, AND 
THE RISE OF A NEW AMERICAN CULTURE xiii, 382-85 (1993). 
7. See generally Neil H. Borden, The Concept of the Marketing Mix, in PROMOTIONAL 
MANAGEME ••• : ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 16, 18. 
8. See Thomas A. Petit & Martha R. McEnally, Putting Strategy Into Promotion Mix Deci-
sions, in PROMOTIONAL MANAGEMENT: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 24, 26. 
9. Borden, supra note 7, at 20. 
10. See Wilbur Schramm, How Communication Works, in PROMOTIONAL MANAGEMENT: 
ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 45, 55. 
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tions that have been controllable at best, and untreatable at worst. 
Pharmacogenomic drugs are alluring. They promise health benefits to 
everybody and renewed financial strength to the pharmaceutical 
sector. 
At the same time, as with many drugs, this generation of 
pharmaceuticals will carry risks to health as well as benefits. When 
new drugs come out, it is often difficult to predict their actual effec-
tiveness or to anticipate major detrimental side effects from taking 
them. Some of this uncertainty arises from the nature of science it-
self.ll But much of it arises from the financial incentives for drug 
companies to hurry new drugs to market in a relatively weak adminis-
trative-regulatory environment. This riskiness has always been a by-
product of drug development. MDM, however, exacerbates the risks 
to health posed by pharmaceuticals based on novel science because 
MDM operates to increase demand for risky products while simulta-
neously downplaying the dangers they pose. MDM also involves en-
suring that the administrative regulation of pharmaceuticals remains 
lax. This creates an opportunity for a powerful industry that promises 
people one of the most basic human goods - health - to cultivate 
demand for, and then develop and promote, drugs that may well pose 
more danger than benefit. 
Notwithstanding this state of affairs, tort law, our legal system's 
most fundamental, most traditional method for addressing such situa-
tions, does not currently provide recourse to those injured by pharma-
ceutical MDM. This is because current tort law does not, so to speak, 
"see" MDM in general, and certainly has not recognized it in the 
pharmaceutical context.12 The problem is heightened because phar-
11. See Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 1 (1995). 
12. In litigation against gun manufacturers, private plaintiffs have articulated something 
like a claim for negligent MDM. See Hamilton v. Accutek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 817-46 (E.D.N.Y. 
1999) (explaining in a post trial memorandum and order the details of the negligence theory 
under which the action proceeded and reporting damages awarded by trial); Hamilton v. Ac· 
cutek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1332 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing shooting victims' tort claims against 
gun manufacturers on theories of products liability and ultra-hazardous liability, but permitting 
cause of action to proceed on negligence theory alleging negligent marketing that fostered the 
trade in illegal sale of handguns); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp .. 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1059-66 
(N.Y. 2001) (declaring, in response to a certified question, that, under New York state law, plain-
tiffs in Hamilton v. Accutek had failed to state a cause of action because defendant gun manufac-
turers do not owe any duty of care to shooting victims). On March 7,2003, a trial court judge in 
San Diego dismissed a lawsuit brought by a dozen cities and counties. Alex Roth, Bulk of Fire-
arms Lawsuit Set Aside: California Cities Fail to Make Their Case, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., 
Mar. 8, 2003, at Al. Unlike the Hamilton v. Acclltek litigation, however, this case was not 
brought on a negligence theory but under a theory of public nuisance, as has been attempted in 
other municipal suits against gunmakers. See id.; see also PETER HARRY BROWN & DANIEL G. 
ABEL, 20 OUTGUNNED: Up AGAINST THE NRA (2003). Some government litigation against 
pharmaceutical companies for economic loss seems to cast the companies' wrongdoing in terms 
of problematic MDM. See infra text accompanying notes 83-87. Regardless of the disposition of 
these claims involving economic harm, I maintain the need for a cause of action for negligent 
MDM resulting in physical injury. 
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maceutical MDM involves biological knowledge alien to most laype-
ople, including courts. 
Basic tort doctrine suggests that to recover for a negligently in-
flicted injury one brings a cause of action for negligence. In practice, 
however, there is no generic cause of action for negligence. When a 
plaintiff brings suit on a negligence theory, the plaintiff complains of 
particular conduct he alleges the defendant executed negligently. For 
example, in a suit arising from an automobile accident, the plaintiff 
pleads negligent driving, not simply negligence, as the conduct for 
which the defendant should be held liable. Likewise, if a surgeon 
leaves a sponge in a patient, she will be sued for medical malpractice 
rather than general negligence. 
It is one thing to comprehend MDM as discrete conduct, but if 
one also appreciates that excessively risky MDM may in some cases 
result in injuries, then one can see the need for courts and legislatures 
to recognize a specific cause of action for negligent MDM. Courts and 
legislatures could even take a more particularistic approach. Suppose 
judges and legislators fear excessively risky MDM in some manufac-
turing sectors but not others: courts and legislatures could recognize 
causes of action for negligent MDM in selected sectors, e.g., permit-
ting a cause of action for negligent pharmaceutical MDM or negligent 
handgun MDM. My point is not that courts and legislatures ought to 
be quite so incremental, but that this option is entirely consistent with 
the structure of tort doctrine. 
Because this article focuses on the conduct of, financial chal-
lenges faced by, and business opportunities available to the American 
pharmaceutical industry, I start with an examination of this industry 
and the way in which the budding field of pharmacogenomics now 
creates both high upside and high downside risks for the industry and 
the consumers it serves. After surveying the business and scientific 
climate in which pharmaceutical companies now operate, I will ex-
plain pharmaceutical MDM, using an illustrative case study of Pfizer 
and its blockbuster drug Neurontin. Finally, having established that 
pharmaceutical MDM is a likely candidate for excessively risky 
MDM, I will spell out how a cause of action for negligent MDM by a 
pharmaceutical company might look, including the defenses a com-
pany might raise. Pharmaceutical MDM need not inevitably be exces-
sively risky MDM, a point I will demonstrate by discussing ways to 
engage in MDM non-negligently. 
This last item is crucial. Not all MDM of pharmaceuticals is neg-
ligent. I am not arguing against MDM for new drugs generally, or 
against MDM for new drugs based on genomics and genetics. To the 
extent that these drugs will enhance human health, they have the po-
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tential to contribute to human flourishing, just as many older 
pharmaceuticals have. Historically, tort doctrine has recognized this 
high-benefit/high-risk aspect of medicinal drugs, and tort law has 
shielded drug companies from liability imposed on other sorts of 
products manufacturers.13 
Increasingly, however, pharmaceutical companies are behaving 
like other makers of consumer goods, particularly powerful producers 
of highly profitable product lines. Like other such merchandisers, 
pharmaceutical companies now engage in practices such as direct mar-
keting and advertising to consumers of drugs, and the constant intro-
duction of newer, slightly modified versions of already existing drugs, 
in an effort to generate demand for products that may not be medi-
cally necessary. They deploy public relations campaigns meant to woo 
physicians into prescribing their products. They utilize the full range 
of legal mechanisms to protect their operations. The more drug com-
panies act as run-of-the-mill merchandisers do, the less fair it is to 
allow these companies to exploit legal protections afforded them be-
cause they have traditionally been perceived to be unlike other 
merchandisers. 
Both economic and legal factors have inspired pharmaceutical 
companies to behave like traditional makers of consumer goods. Pat-
ents on drugs vital to health have long expired; patents on drugs that 
definitely enhance health are about to expire; drugs the companies are 
ready to patent now are not in any way critical to health; and a new 
generation of medically significant drugs - the generation based on 
genomics - is not yet producing income for pharmaceutical 
companies. 
13. For example, the pharmaceutical industry's products were always exempted from strict 
products liability. A comment to Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts specified 
that the strict liability contemplated in the black letter of the Section did not apply to legal drugs. 
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of 
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordi-
nary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example 
is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very 
serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invaria-
bly leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully 
justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such 
a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is 
not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, 
vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except 
to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of 
many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity 
for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even 
of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use 
of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, 
again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper 
warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for 
unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to 
supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a 
known but apparently reasonable risk. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). 
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We can anticipate that modern merchandising practices, in com-
bination with advances in pharmocogenomics, will enable drug com-
panies to bring the next generation of pharmaceuticals - drugs 
tailored to treat disease at the genetic level - out of the laboratory 
and into consumers' hands relatively quickly. The effectiveness of 
modern merchandising and the relative immaturity of the science be-
hind this generation of drugs together give rise to a problem tort law 
both should and must address. When producers and consumers are 
both intent on availability and use of a comparatively poorly under-
stood yet risky product, the odds of personal injury go up. How high 
they go depends in part on whether the common law of tort permits 
juries to decide whether a merchandiser has acted negligently in its 
development and promotion of a drug. 
In essence, the current state of affairs in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, and the absence of a cause of action for negligent MDM, en-
courages drug makers to perform natural experiments on human 
subjects (sell drugs to patients), subjects who have been primed to 
participate by the experimenters (using MDM), experimenters who 
stand to gain much financially simply by running the experiment (sell-
ing the drugs), knowing that, at least for now, tort law makes it diffi-
cult for anybody injured in the experiment to state a valid claim, let 
alone win damages. 
II. A CASE STUDY OF PHARMACEUTICAL MDM 
From the mid-twentieth century to the century's end, the pharma-
ceutical industry enjoyed two major rounds of success. The first in-
cluded the development of antibiotics and vaccines; the second, the 
development of drugs to control, if not cure, chronic serious health 
problems such as depression, high cholesterol, and high blood pres-
sure. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, drug 
companies were no longer reaping such large profits from these two 
waves of drug development. Both legal and market forces have led to 
the decline. On the legal side, patent protection for many twentieth 
century "wonder drugs" has expired.14 On the market side, both pri-
14. Drug companies fight extremely hard to preserve patent protection. See, e.g., Milt 
Freudenheim, Ruling Backs Some Patents on a Leading Ulcer Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,2002, at 
C14 (reporting AstraZeneca's success in demonstrating patent infringement on Prilosec by three 
generic drug manufacturers; Prilosec is one of the world's best-selling prescription drugs). "This 
ruling vindicates our very strong belief in our intellectual property, [said a spokeswoman for 
AstraZenecaJ." [d. Before the expiration of Prilosec's original patent (not the one at issue in 
the aforementioned lawsuit), Prilosec, or omeparazole, was literally the world's best-selling drug, 
reaping at least $6 billion in worldwide sales. [d. Aside from seeking to extend and expand 
patent protection for Prilosec, AstraZeneca is "trying to persuade doctors to switch patients 
from Prilosec to a similar successor drug, Nexium." [d. This matters because in the ruling stat-
ing that some generics makers had infringed AstraZeneca's patents, the judge also ruled that one 
generic version of Prilosec does not infringe any patents, opening the door to production of a 
lower cost version of the drug. [d. 
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vate and public insurers have pressured physicians, pharmacies, and 
patients to use generics or less expensive versions of branded drugs, 
part of a larger effort to control health care costs overall.15 Hospitals 
too are trying to escape traditional purchasing systems that are fi-
nanced by pharmaceutical manufacturers.16 They seek independent 
bargaining power to negotiate lower drug costsP 
So, the pharmaceutical industry has lost some luster, both in 
terms of the sector's stock performance and in terms of maintaining a 
reputation for producing "wonder drugs." Manufacturers have ad-
dressed the decline in profitability through a combination of tactics, 
which create a climate infused with risk of harm, one that will only be 
exacerbated when the first pharmacogenomic drugs hit the market. 
For example, drug companies routinely pay insurance plans to in-
crease the use of their products: the drug company pays the insurance 
plan to add its drug to lists of recommended drugs that are distributed 
to physicians and pharmacies.18 Drug companies also give physicians 
and pharmacies direct financial reward for switching a patient from a 
rival's product to their own.19 While many companies use these and 
other components of MDM for their pharmaceuticals, one drug 
maker, Pfizer, has used MDM to become, according to the Financial 
Times, the "world's largest pharmaceutical group."20 "Pfizer has be-
come the first company to capture more than 10% of the worldwide 
prescription pharmaceutical market."21 This success is not unrelated 
to Pfizer's much remarked upon MDM. 
In 2002, Pfizer was named "Marketer of the Year," according to a 
pharmaceutical trade publication, with "the company ... exceeding its 
nearest competitor's annual sales by $2.4 billion based on sales of Pfi-
zer drugs and jointly promoted products."22 Pfizer is on the verge of 
getting bigger through a shareholder-approved acquisition of 
Pharmacia, in a deal worth $57 billion.23 As is, Pfizer leads the drug 
market in central nervous system therapies, merchandising drugs to 
treat ailments such as depression, epilepsy, insomnia, and migraine 
15. See, e.g., Ron Winslow et aI., States, Insurers Find Prescriptions for High Drug Costs, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2002, at AI. 
16. Mary Williams Walsh, More Hospitals Change the Way They Buy Drugs and Supplies, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2002, at C1. 
17. Id. 
18. Robert Pear, Drug Makers Battle a U.S. Plan To Curb Rewards for Doctors, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2002, at AI. 
19. Id. 
20. Ellen Kelleher, Pfizer Wins Drug Approval, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2002, at 19. 
21. Frank Scussa, Unparalleled, MED. AD. NEWS, Sept. 1,2001, at 149. 
22. Andrew Humphreys, Marketer of the Year: Pfizer; Touched by Pfizer; This Company 
Turns Drugs Into Highly Successful Brands, MED. AD. NEWS, Mar. 1.2002, available at 2002 WL 
11845459. 
23. Kelleher, supra note 20, at 19. 
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headaches.24 With the addition of Pharmacia's drug portfolio, Pfizer 
will become a significant supplier of "drugs for cancer, ophthalmol-
ogy, and endocrine disorders."25 
Originally developed by Warner-Lambert, Neurontin is presently 
the number one acute epilepsy drug on the market and an important 
revenue generator for Pfizer.26 Pfizer acquired the drug when it took 
over Parke-Davis, which had previously acquired Warner-Lambert. 
"Used by [over] 7.7 million patients in 75 countries, [Neurontin] gen-
erated sales of $1.75 billion in 2001. "27 To ensure the continued suc-
cess of Neurontin, Pfizer has engaged in three major practices to 
promote its usage. Pfizer has creatively attempted to extend patent 
protection; promoted Neurontin through direct ads to consumers; and 
encouraged "off-label" use of the drug. Pfizer's efforts have paid off 
handsomely. In December 2002, "Pfizer, Inc., reported that third-
quarter net income increased by 12 % to $2.452 billion. "28 When asked 
what makes Pfizer's marketing strategy so successful, Pat Kelly, Se-
nior Vice President of Worldwide Marketing, responded that "we 
practice integrated marketing. We integrate all the channels of mar-
keting that we use with a common message and common approach. "29 
Claiming an infringement on two Neurontin patents, Pfizer 
brought suit against Apotex Corporation in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. With little discussion, the 
court found no genuine issue of material fact in Pfizer's patent in-
fringement claim, granting summary judgment in favor of the defend-
ants.3D Additionally, the Health and Benefit Trust Fund of the 
International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, 
has filed an anti-trust [case] in the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York claiming illegal overcharges made for 
Neurontin .... According to the complaint, Warner-Lambert and 
Pfizer have maintained false patent-infringement lawsuits against 
potential generic competitors for Neurontin ... for the purpose of 
delaying and preventing generic competition.31 
24. ld. 
25. ld. 
26. Pfizer Faces Legal Actions Over Top-Selling Products, MED. AD. NEWS, June 1,2002, at 
14 [hereinafter Pfizer Faces). 
27. ld. 
28. Pfizer, Inc.: Pharamacutical Announces Strong Third-Quarter 2002 Results, BIOTECH 
WK., Dec. 4, 2002, at 45. "Revenues of $8.725 billion in the third quarter of 2002 were up 12%, 
compared with the third quarter of 2001, paced by human pharmaceutical revenues of $7.058 
billion in the quarter, which grew 13%." ld. Neurontin figured significantly in this jump. 
"Eleven products - Lipitor, Norvasc, Neurontin, Viagra, Zoloft, Celebrex, Bextra, Geodon, 
Aricept, Zyrtec, and Diflucan - representing 82% of Pfizer's human pharmaceutical revenues 
grew a combined 17%." ld. 
29. Andrew Humphreys, Breaking the Marketing Mold, MED. AD. NEWS, Mar. 1. 2001, at 1. 
30. Warner Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98-C-4293, 2001 WL 1104618 (N.D. Ill. 
2001); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98-C-4293, 1999 WL 259946 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
31. Pfizer Faces, supra note 26, at 14. 
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The AFL-CIO case has been consolidated with seventeen other cases 
for pretrial proceedings.32 Original patents for Neurontin expired in 
1994 and 2000. "In April 2000 however, a U.S. patent was granted for 
stable pharmaceutical compositions of Neurontin containing low 
levels of lactam impurity."33 Five generic manufacturers have filed 
abbreviated new drug applications to market generic versions of 
Neurontin. Although Pfizer seems likely to continue to fight for ex-
tended patent protection,34 "[s]ales of Neurontin are predicted to de-
crease almost $300 million after the product is exposed to generics, 
which is expected to occur in 2003."35 Pfizer, however, has already 
secured patent protection until 2017 on one version of Neurontin.36 
Pfizer has sought patent protection for Neurontin against the fol-
lowing regulatory environment. In 1984, Congress sought to balance 
interests in the pharmaceutical industry by passing the 1984 Hatch-
Waxman Act.37 It included "patent protection and research incentives 
for brand-name drug makers," along with incentives to encourage 
companies to sell less expensive generic versions of name-brand drugs 
once the name-brand patents expire.38 However, loopholes in the law 
have allowed companies to prolong the typical twenty-year patent and 
keep generic alternatives out of consumers' reach. 
Companies can get an automatic 30-month extension [of a patent] 
simply by filing suit against a generic manufacturer asserting that 
the generic product will infringe secondary patents on packaging 
and other minor items. 
In some cases, manufacturers have been able to. get even longer 
extensions by filing multiple patent-infringement suits [and gaining 
sequential 30-day extensions].39 
Following the lead of a Senate bill introduced the previous sum-
mer (a bill not acted upon by the House to date),40 in the fall of 2002, 
President Bush proposed regulations to expedite approval of low-cost 
generic versions of prescription drugs.41 According to President 
Bush's proposed rule, "when a brand-name manufacturer believes 
that a generic product has infringed its patents, it can delay approval 
32. See In Re Neurontin Antitrust Litig., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1380 (J.P.M.L. 2002) (finding that 
all seventeen cases alleged that Warner-Lambert and its parent, Pfizer, "violated anti-trust laws 
and excluded generic competition for [Neuron tin] by bringing sham patent infringement actions 
against a number of generic drug manufacturers"). 
33. Pfizer, MED. AD. NEWS, Sept. 1, 2002, at 150. 
34. Pfizer Faces, supra note 26, at 14. 
35. Id. 
36. Pfizer, supra note 33, at 150. 
37. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 
98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
38. Robert Pear, Bush Seeks Faster Generic Drug Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2002, at 
A24. 
39. Ending a Drug Patent Scam, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2002, at A30. 
40. See Pear, supra note 38, at A24. 
41. Id. 
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of a generic copy [only once] for 30 months, while a court tries to 
resolve the dispute."42 "In addition, the proposal would forbid brand-
name companies from getting new patents for three kinds of reasons, 
including redesigned pill packages, that the FTC concluded were friv-
olous and used mainly to forestall competition."43 Critics fault Bush's 
recommendations for failing to address "the agreements under which 
brand-name drug companies sometimes pay generic companies to 
keep low-cost generic versions off the market. "44 
While the effort to plug the loopholes of Hatch-Waxman and 
place other constraints on brand-name drug manufacturers may limit 
the role of patent protection in MDM of pharmaceuticals, so far Pfizer 
has relatively successfully used the patent system to protect Neuron-
tin. While Neurontin may face generic competitors in 2003, Pfizer's 
efforts have prevented generic versions from reaching the market for 
three to nine years longer than contemplated under the original 
patents.45 
Most people in the United States have noticed that drug compa-
nies advertise their products on television, radio, and in print media.46 
These ads encourage patients to ask their doctors if such-and-such a 
drug is right for them. Physicians report that patients do indeed ask 
for particular branded drugs, sometimes influenced more by the pitch 
than the product's actual medical purpose.47 
"Among all pharmaceutical companies, Pfizer ranked No.2 in 
consumer expenditure through October 2001, at $301.5 million, repre-
senting 12.6% of the industry's $2.4 billion consumer expenditure."48 
"Pfizer markets eight prescription brands that generate more than $1 
billion in annual sales. [It] spends more than any other company on 
42. Id. 
43. Amy Goldstein, Bush Plan to Increase Generic Drugs Draws Flak, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 
2002, at A6. 
44. Pear, supra note 38, at A24. 
45. According to one industry journal: 
By listing patents with the Food and Drug Administration that do not claim the FDA 
approved form of the drug or its approved uses, ... [Pfizer] has been able to delay 
generics competition for 18 months past the expiration of [Neuron tin's ] basic patent. 
The potential lost savings to Americans by this delay has already amounted to approxi-
mately $825 million. 
Furthermore, by strategically timing the submission of patents to the FDA, [Pfizer] 
effectively converted the automatic 30-month stay of generic approvals into 54 months 
of additional market exclusivity. 
Kathleen Jaeger, Access to Affordable Generics Saves Billions of Dollars, CHAIN DRUG REV., 
Aug. 5, 2002, at Rx28. 
46. In a survey conducted by The Intermedia Advertising Group, the most-remembered 
television ads for prescription drugs during the 2001-02 television season were for the following 
drugs: Viagra, Flonase, Procrit, Vioxx, Lipitor, Zyrtec, Celebrex, Nexium, and Paxil. Viagra ads, 
the most remembered, were produced by Cline, Davis & Mann. Allison Fass, Marketing 
Medicine, N.'f. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at C8. Note that Cline, Davis & Mann is the same agency 
that markets Neurontin for Pfizer. See infra text accompanying note 53. 
47. See, e.g., Erin N. Marcus, When TV Commercials Play the Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 
2003, at A21 (discussing how prescription drug ads can create frivolous demands). 
48. Humphreys, supra note 22. 
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product promotion, and outspends the closest company by about $600 
million in research and development."49 Apart from just toting up 
total numbers spent on product promotion and development, pharma-
ceutical industry publications report specific ways Pfizer leverages its 
global promotional apparatus to squeeze the most value from its prod-
ucts.50 Its field and marketing personnel, spread throughout the 
world, number in excess of thirty thousand employees. 51 For direct-
to-consumer advertising, Pfizer spent $250 million in 2000; this was 
the third largest expenditure on this item in the pharmaceutical indus-
try as a whole.52 
Cline, Davis & Mann (CDM), one of the most admired full ser-
vice agencies in the health care advertising industry, won the Neuron-
tin account in 1996.53 In 1987, CDM created a group, CDM 
Consumer, specifically charged with developing demand for the prod-
ucts developed by pharmaceutical companies. Over the years, CDM 
has managed many aspects of consumer-oriented MDM: it "has expe-
rience across a broad range of categories, including over-the-counter 
products, direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription products, ... 
and prescription to over-the-counter switches" for specific drugs.54 
CDM provides these services via a concerted, trademarked, person-
nel-coordinated system called StrategySession. StrategySession de-
ploys multi-disciplinary teams comprised of advertising specialists and 
representatives from the client's organization.55 This team format en-
ables CDM to fully integrate the marketing of clients such as Pfizer -
that is, to accomplish MDM.56 
Although physicians have total regulatory freedom to supply any 
drug approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for any 
use, the FDA forbids drug companies from marketing a drug for indi-
cations other than those for which the drug has won FDA approval.57 
This ban applies to marketing to physicians as well as to consumers, 
although pharmaceutical companies may "share research and journal 
articles with doctors that discuss unapproved uses."58 When physi-
49. Scussa, supra note 21, at 149. 
50. See, e.g., id.; see infra text accompanying notes 70-79. 
51. Scussa, supra note 21, at 149. 
52. Id. 
53. Frank Scussa, Cline, Davis & Mann, Inc., MED. AD. NEWS, Apr. 1,2002, at 46. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. These experts often comprise team members from agency account, creative, media 
and research groups. 
56. Id. 
57. Associated Press, Group Sues Pharmacia Over Drug Promotion (Dec. 24, 2002), availa· 
ble at http://www.180OJawinfo.comJpractice/news.htm?story_id=3986&LOpic=bextra. 
58. Id. 
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cians prescribe a medication for a condition other than the one(s) rec-
ognized by the FDA, the practice is known as off-label usage.59 
Originally, Neurontin was FDA-approved only for epilepsy.60 In 
2002, Pfizer gained approval for Neurontin as a treatment for manag-
ing pain associated with shingles, the only additional FDA-approved 
use for the drug.61 Currently, the Boston United States Attorney's 
Office, "47 states[,] and the District of Columbia are investigating" 
potentially illegal promotion of off-label usage of Neurontin during 
the period Warner-Lambert merchandised the drug.62 Discovery has 
uncovered memoranda from 1995 and 1996 documenting the decision 
by Warner-Lambert's "new product committee" not to conduct large 
clinical trials required for FDA approval of Neurontin for treatment 
of migraines and social phobia.63 The committee decided instead to 
perform small studies and place the results in medical journals.64 A 
1995 company memorandum stated "that 25 percent of Neurontin 
prescriptions were" for off-label usage.65 In 2001, the majority of all 
Neurontin prescriptions written in the United States - roughly three-
quarters of them - were for off-label uses.66 Sales figures for 
Neurontin in 2001 were $1.75 billion.67 In 2002, it appears that ap-
proximately eighty percent of Neurontin prescriptions were written 
for conditions other than epilepsy, the FDA-approved indication;68 
and early estimates show that Neurontin has reached two billion dol-
lars in sales in 2002.69 
The memoranda documenting the activities of Warner-Lambert 
executives were released by the attorney for a private plaintiff, Dr. 
David Franklin, M.D. - a former Parke-Davis "medicalliaison"70-
now suing Pfizer.71 According to press reports, Franklin, "alleges he 
was forced to participate in a national marketing campaign in which 
59. Off-label usage is both common and, in some cases, controversial. For example, 
Pharmacia, the company about to merge with Pfizer, has recently been sued by a California 
senior citizens group alleging "that Pharmacia hired Scirex, a clinical testing firm owned in part 
by Omnicom, a large advertising conglomerate, to study Bextra for use in cases of acute pain 
caused by impacted molars." {d. The FDA has approved Bextra for chronic pain associated 
with a variety of conditions, but not pain caused by dental problems. [d. In fact, the FDA had 
specifically refused Pharmacia's request for Bextra for acute pain due to impacted molars. {d. 
60. Melody Petersen, Memos Cast Shadow on Drug's Promotion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 
2002, at C2. 
61. {d. 
62. Group Sues Pharmacia Over Drug Promotion, supra note 57. 
63. Petersen, supra note 60, at C2. 
64. {d. 
65. {d. 
66. Liz Kowalczyk, Pfizer Drug Strategy Probed States Question Marketing Tactics for 
Neurontin, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 18,2002, at D2. 
67. {d. 
68. Petersen, supra note 60, at C2. 
69. {d. 
70. United States ex reI. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 44 (D. Mass. 2001). 
71. David Armstrong & Charles Forelle, Health & Technology: Drug Officials May Have 
Broken Rules on Neurontin, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2002, at B4. 
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he and others made exaggerated or false claims about the safety and 
efficacy of the drug."72 Franklin also claims that "illegal promotion of 
the drug defrauded the federal government out of hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in Medicaid payments."73 
Other documents uncovered in Franklin's suit and reported in the 
press further detail Warner-Lambert's MDM strategy: allegedly, the 
company provided ghost-written journal articles for physicians to pub-
lish under their own names and rewarded the largest potential 
prescribers with all-expense paid weekend trips to a Florida beach re-
sort (in addition to expenses, each physician allegedly received a $250 
honorarium).74 
Franklin claims that he recorded a manager telling company med-
ical liaisons, "When we get out there, we want to kick some ass. We 
want to sell Neurontin on pain. All right?"75 According to media re-
ports, the unsealed documents in the litigation also reveal how 
"Parke-Davis [now Pfizer] hired Medical Education Systems [(MES)] 
of Philadelphia to draft 12 articles and opinion letters on antiepileptic 
drug therapy."76 Parke-Davis' agreement with MES "gave Parke-Da-
vis the right to select the authors of the articles, receive prepublication 
copies of the articles and suggest changes to them."77 According to 
the company memos, as described in the media, 
MES compiled a list of topics, such as the use of antiepileptics for 
pain and psychiatric illness, and proposed physicians to act as au-
thors. The company paid the doctors $1,000 each to review and re-
vise drafts written by MES and lend their names to the articles .... 
In an Oct. 29, 1997, memo, MES told Parke-Davis that it still was 
trying to track down Dr. John Pellock of the Medical College of 
Virginia for an article about pediatric seizure disorders: "Author 
interested; still playing phone tag. MES HAS DRAFT COM-
PLETED, WE JUST NEED AN AUTHOR."78 
It was also reported that Dr. Franklin revealed he was "told to cold-
call doctors and sell them on the off-label benefits of Neurontin while 
at Warner-Lambert."79 
In addition to the civil actions against Pfizer, the federal Justice 
Department is investigating whether Pfizer made illegal payments to 
Medicaid providers, including an enquiry into the "prescribing prac-
72. [d. 
73. [d. 
74. Liz Kowalczyk, Drug Company Push on Doctors Disclosed, BOSTON GLOBE, May 19, 
2002, at Al (noting further that the Neurontin marketing team wrote that doctors who attended 
the conference "were delivered a hard-hitting message about the drug"). 
75. [d. 
76. [d. 
77. Armstrong & Forelle, supra note 71, at B4. 
78. Kowalczyk, supra note 74, at AI. 
79. Jon Chesto, Suit Questions Ott-label Sales of Neurontin, BOSTON HERALD, May 18, 
2002, at 20. 
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tices of individual doctors for dates before and after their exposure to 
specific marketing practices .... In Massachusetts, Medicaid spending 
on ... Neurontin grew from $1.1 million in 1996 to $14.1 million in 
2000, the height of the marketing campaign."so "Newly unsealed 
court documents reveal that some physicians, in exchange for money, 
have allowed pharmaceutical sales representatives into their examin-
ing rooms to meet with patients, review medical charts and recom-
mend what medicines to prescribe."sl This "shadowing program" 
enables Pfizer to promote both approved and off-label uses.S2 The 
program "involved an estimated 75 to 100 doctors in several North-
east states .... Each doctor was paid $350 or more for each day they 
let sales representatives watch as they examined patients, according to 
court documents."s3 
Despite this flurry of inquiry, Pfizer remains alert to opportuni-
ties to market Neurontin and its other drugs. Pfizer has moved into 
health-care practice managementS4 - presumably seeking the benefit 
of vertically integrating the distribution of their drug products through 
managed care providers controlled by Pfizer. To increase the appeal 
of Pfizer's drugs directly to doctors, Pfizer, working with IBM and 
Microsoft, plans to "provide physicians with an integrated suite of 
Web-enabled software and devices to minimize paperwork" involved 
in prescription and insurance practices.s5 
Nevertheless, political, economic, and legal pressures make pro-
tection of existing drugs something of a rearguard action. The phar-
maceutical industry as a whole is looking to a new wave of drugs, 
based on pharmacogenomics, to protect the long-term profitability of 
the sector. Presumably, Pfizer, which tops the industry by an extra 
$600 million per year spent on research and development, is also hop-
ing to develop gene-tailored therapies, drugs meant to cure and pre-
vent disease by intervening at the genetic level of the human 
organism.s6 Researchers and manufacturers alike see such drugs 
(genuceuticals) as the wave of medicine's future. 
III. TOWARD PHARMACOGENOMICS: MAPPING THE 
HUMAN GENOME 
Two major organizations have mapped the human genome. One 
is a publicly financed international consortium called The Human 
80. Kowalczyk, supra note 74, at D2. 
81. Melody Petersen, Suit Says Company Promoted Drug in Exam Rooms, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 15, 2002, at C1. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Scussa, supra note 21, at 152. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 149. 
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Genome Project (HGP);87 the other a private corporation called 
Celera.88 The relationship between these two groups, their efforts to 
map the genome, and the public policy issues raised by their competi-
tion to complete a useable map, all bear upon the drug companies' 
prospects of cashing in on human genomics. 
The Human Genome Project began before Celera's efforts. The 
organizers of HGP did not anticipate competition from the private 
sector, primarily because the technology and knowledge required to 
map the human genome seemed sufficiently costly to develop and ob-
tain that it seemed unlikely any private actor could compete with the 
highly sophisticated international consortium's efforts. This hypothe-
sis turned out to be wrong. A combination of excellent fund-raising 
and good science enabled Celera to become a serious candidate for 
mapping the human genome before HGP. 
While the competition between the two entities almost certainly 
accelerated the pace of scientific progress - as is typical in scientific 
enterprise more generally - the competition forced both parties to 
address significant and difficult choices, including whether and when 
to cooperate with each other, whether to attempt to patent any or all 
of the human genome, and whether to fight the patentability of the 
genome by anybody. HGP's mission had never been for-profit, but 
because Celera seemed prone to trying to patent the genome and find-
ings related to it, those heading HGP also considered seeking patents. 
By doing so, they could then license the use of their findings and tech-
nology more extensively and at far less (perhaps zero) cost than a pri-
vate company like Celera would be expected to, if Celera were willing 
to license its findings at all. Alternatively, either HGP or Celera 
might fight any patent application proffered by the other on the 
grounds that the proposed patent, say of a particular gene sequence, 
was not in fact a patentable entity. While in the short term that would 
mean that the winner of such a case would also lose the right to seek 
that sort of patent, in the long term the loss might be worth it, if the 
winner thought its venture would achieve a clearly patentable entity 
first - especially if the patent application in dispute revealed infor-
mation that would be useful to further research. Basically, HGP and 
Celera were playing a many-layered game of chicken. 
87. The publicly financed international consortium consisted of eight laboratories. These 
included the Whitehead Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts, the Washington University 
School of Medicine in St. Louis, Missouri, and Baylor College of Medicine in Houston, Texas. 
Feds Pay to Push Genome Project, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 17, 1999, at http://www.wired.comlnews/ 
technology/0,1282,18520,00.html. International HGP funding partners include the United King-
dom, France, Germany, Japan, and China. NICHOLAS WADE, LIFE SCRIPT: How THE HUMAN 
GENOME DISCOVERIES WILL TRANSFORM MEDICINE AND ENHANCE YOUR HEALTH 24 (2001). 
88. For further information, see Celera's hompage at http://www.celera.com. 
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Happily, from a public policy perspective, neither HGP nor 
Celera sought patents on their most basic research findings. I say hap-
pily because the public availability of these findings makes it easier for 
those who want to use basic scientific findings in genomics and genet-
ics to produce practical goods - especially beneficial pharmaceuticals 
- and to do so without having to incur potentially crippling up-front 
costs to gain access to these findings. From an ethical perspective, too, 
it seems inappropriate to attempt to patent a map of the human gen-
ome. I will not pursue the argument here, but I would claim it ethi-
cally wrong to privatize the basic information about what human 
beings so fundamentally share - a species-wide genetic heritage. 
IV. GENOMICS MEETS GENETICS AND 
YIELDS PHARMACOGENOMICS 
"A 1998 study of hospitalized patients published in the Journal of 
the American Medical Association reported that in 1994, adverse drug 
reactions accounted for more than 2.2 million serious cases and over 
100,000 deaths, making adverse drug reactions (ADRs) one of the 
leading causes of hospitalization and death in the United States."89 
One reason for the high rate of such adverse reaction is that, tradition-
ally, drug companies have not been able to tailor drugs to differences 
in physiology due to genetic variation in individuals. 
To produce drugs that treat disease at the genetic level requires 
two types of basic science. One is genomics, the acquisition and study 
of information encoded in the human genome.90 Because the human 
genome has only recently been mapped to a meaningful degree (pre-
vious maps are drafts), and because the technology necessary to inter-
pret the maps is very young,91 genomics remains in its infancy. The 
other basic science necessary is genetics, understood most generally as 
the study of heredity, and, more specifically, as the study of the inheri-
tance of particular traits.92 Armed with information about an individ-
ual's genome, which she shares with other members of her species, 
and information about the arrangement and expression of her particu-
lar genes, biomedical researchers have begun a new science -
pharmacogenomics.93 
89. NAT'L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., JUST THE FACTS: A BASIC INTRODUCTION TO 
THE SCIENCE UNDERLYING NCBI RESOURCES, ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: THE PROMISE OF 
PHARMACOGENOMICS, at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/pharm.html (last revised 
Feb. 13, 2003) [hereinafter JUST THE FACTS]. 
90. MARK H. RICHMOND, HUMAN GENOMICS: PROSPECTS FOR HEALTH CARE AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 6 (1999). 
91. This technology is known as bioinformatics and is the science of developing computer 
technology to analyze genomes. 
92. RICHMOND, supra note 90, at 6. 
93. "Pharmacogenomics is a science that examines the inherited variations in genes that 
dictate drug response and explores the ways these variations can be used to predict whether a 
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One potential promise of genomics is the development of tech-
niques that would enable physicians, working with geneticists, to 
pinpoint how a person will respond to a drug (this includes both posi-
tive and negative reactions). Without knowing all of the genes in-
volved in drug response, scientists have found it difficult to develop 
genetic tests that could predict a person's response to a particular 
drug. Presumptively, a fuller understanding of the genome will allevi-
ate this difficulty.94 But a significant obstacle to gene-tailored 
pharmaceuticals is that drug reaction is a multigenic trait, the sort of 
genetic trait whose nature is most difficult to ascertain.95 Further-
more, the best gene-tailored pharmaceuticals should take account not 
only of genomics but also genetics, specific information about gene 
expression in particular individuals. To appreciate the challenges 
faced by current pharmacogenomics, it helps to have some additional 
understanding of the basic science of genomics and genetics. 
Each organism on earth has a genome, shared by organisms of 
that type. A genome "contains all of the biological information 
needed to build and maintain a living example of that organism."96 
Genomes specify the uniqueness of organisms through the biological 
information encoded in the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) that is the 
stuff of the genome. In turn, some of this DNA is "divided into dis-
crete units called genes."97 "Genes code for proteins that attach to the 
genome at the appropriate positions and switch on a series of reac-
tions called gene expression."98 
Protein coding genes matter because they instruct cells to per-
form functions that result in variation in organisms. Human protein 
coding genes, for example, instruct the human organism's skin cells to 
make human skin, human stomach cells to make human stomach, and 
so forth.99 The coding regions of the human genome constitute less 
than five percent of the total genome. lOO With a map of the human 
patient will have a good response to a drug, a bad response to a drug, or no response at all." 
JUST THE FACTS, supra note 89. 
94. RICHMOND, supra note 90, at 18. 
95. JUST THE FACTS, supra note 89. 
96. NAT'L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., A BASIC INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE UN-
DERLYING NCBI RESOURCES, WHAT IS A GENOME?, at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/pri-
mer/genetics..genome.html (last revised Feb. 20, 2003) [hereinafter WHAT IS A GENOME?]. 
97. [d. 
98. [d. 
99. PETER LITTLE, GENETIC DESTINIES 13 (2002). 
100. Scientists estimate the number of genes in a genome by looking for certain 
tell-tale signs of genes in a DNA sequence. These include: open reading frames, 
stretches of DNA, usually greater than 100 bases, that are not interrupted by a stop 
codon such as TAA, TAG or TGA; start codons such as ATG; specific sequences found 
at splice junctions, a location in the DNA sequence where RNA removes the non coding 
areas to form a continuous gene transcript for translation into a protein; and gene regu-
latory sequences. This process is dependent on computer programs that search for 
these patterns in various sequence databases and then make predictions about the exis-
tence of a gene. 
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genome - and bioinfomatic tools with which to navigate it - scien-
tists can begin to correlate genes with traits, including diseases or pre-
dispositions to disease. 
Even with good navigational tools, correlating genes with traits is 
extremely difficult. Very few human traits, including diseases or sus-
ceptibility to them, correlate to a single gene.101 Instead, traits result 
from a complex interaction between genes that code for different pro-
teins, as well as extra-genetic environmental factors. 
Furthermore, individual members of the human species vary in 
their traits, ranging from recognizable differences in hair and eye 
color to less apparent ones such as blood type. When two individuals 
display different phenotypes (or expressions) of the same trait - e.g., 
eye or hair color - they have two different alleles for the same gene. 
This means that the gene's sequence is slightly different in the two 
individuals, and the gene is polymorphic. So, while people generally 
have the same genes, the genes do not have exactly the same DNA 
sequence.102 Thus, we end up with genetic variation among members 
of a single species. 
In contrast to genornics, which explores genetic information at 
the level of the species (and large populations within a species), the 
science of genetics explores genetic variation among individual mem-
bers of a species.103 One cause of genetic variation at this level is 
mutation, a change in the DNA sequence of a gene. Biomedical ge-
neticists pay particular attention to mutations because a mutation can 
cause disease or predispose an organism to disease.104 "When the in-
formation coded for by a gene changes, the resulting protein may not 
function properly or may not even be made at all. In either case, the 
WHAT IS A GENOME?, supra note 96. 
101. Multigenic traits result from the expression of several different genes. 
This is(, for example,] true for human eye color, in which at least three different genes 
are responsible for determining eye color. A brownlblue gene and a central brown 
gene are both found on chromosome 15, whereas a greenlblue gene is found on chro-
mosome 19. The interaction between these genes is not well understood. It is specu-
lated that there may be other genes that control other factors, such as the amount of 
pigment deposited in the iris. This multigenic system explains why two blue-eyed indi-
viduals can have a brown-eyed child. 
[d.; see also LITTLE, supra note 99, at 45 ("In practice, there are relatively few features of human 
beings that are defined by a single-gene difference."). 
102. LITTLE, supra note 99, at 13. 
103. Subspecialties of genetics include molecular genetics, which explore genetic variation at 
the biochemical level, examining the molecular structure of the genes embedded in DNA, and 
cytogenetics, which examines "the relationship between human cells ... and heredity." NAT'L 
CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., A BASIC INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE UNDERLYING 
NCBI RESOURCES, MOLECULAR GENETICS: PIECING IT TOGETHER, at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih. 
gov/About/primer/genetics_molecular.html (last revised Feb. 20, 2003) [hereinafter MOLECULAR 
GENETICS]. 
104. RICHMOND, supra note 90, at 12. 
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cells containing that genetic change may no longer perform as 
expected. "105 
To understand the relationship between genes, heredity, and dis-
ease in humans requires an in-depth understanding of individual peo-
ple's karotypes, a size-order alignment of chromosome pairs in a 
chart. To the extent geneticists can read a good chart in detail, they 
can connect chromosomes (which carry genes) to particular symptoms 
and traits. Obtaining a reasonably useful chromosomal chart has 
taken almost fifty years; and we still lack a fully useful chart for pur-
poses of understanding how chromosomes, genes, and mutation work 




105. MOLECULAR GENETICS, supra note 103. For example, 
mutations in the gene that codes for the cholesterol receptor protein that are associated 
with a disease called Familial Hypercholesterolemia. The cells of an individual with 
this disease end up having reduced receptor function and cannot remove a sufficient 
amount of low density lipoprotein (LDL), or bad cholesterol, from their bloodstream. 
A person may then develop dangerously high levels of cholesterol, putting them at 
increased risk for both heart attack and stroke. 
106. Early efforts to align the chromosome pairs were rudimentary. 
By 1959, about all that could be discerned was an extra or missing chromosome. 
Throughout the 1960s, pioneering cytogeneticists amassed techniques for capturing 
chromosomes at their most visible state. For most of a cell's existence, the chromo-
somal material is unwound and unable to absorb dyes. It is only during cell division 
that the chromosomes condense and become detectable. Researchers learned that 
treating cells with a hypotonic solution would cause them to swell, spreading apart the 
tangle of chromosomes. Another chemical agent, colchicine, was found to stop cell 
division when the chromosomes were at their most striking state. A third chemical, 
phytohemagglutinin, was found to entice lymphocytes, the blood cells most accessible 
for chromosomal study, to divide. 
Even with these tools, scientists still found it difficult to distinguish chromosome pairs. 
[R]esearchers had to rely on such large-scale and subjective clues as chromosome size 
and position of the centromere, a characteristically located constriction in each chro-
mosome. Even staining the chromosomes distinguished unequivocally only four of the 
23 chromosome pairs. These pairs were then grouped crudely by size, and only large 
sections of extra or missing chromosomal material could be discerned. By the 1970s, 
combining stains with digestive enzymes yielded far more subtle shading patterns, re-
vealing the distinctive characteristic of each chromosome. Several different treatments 
were also developed that allowed researchers to further define the patterns of each 
chromosome. Now, tiny inversions - reversals in the banding pattern - duplications, 
deficiencies, and trans locations - chromosomes that swap parts - could be detected. 
But building a karyotype required many hours of skilled work. The karyotyping proce-
dure involved obtaining blood or some other appropriate tissue, separating out dividing 
cells, growing them in culture, fixing them, and then dropping them onto a microscope 
slide. Then, using a light microscope, a researcher had to find a cell in which all of the 
untangled chromosomes were present and a photograph was taken. A print was then 
developed. and the individual chromosomes were cut out and arranged in pairs by size 
order into a chart, referred to as the karyotype. It is literally a scissors-and-tape opera-
tion and ... many cytogenetics laboratories still depend chiefly on this method of chro-
mosome analysis. But now an automatic chromosome analyzer - a system that 
includes a camera, a computer, and a microscope - may radically speed and improve 
the accuracy of the chromosome views. 
People continue to fashion new techniques for chromosomal analysis. One apparently 
promising approach is fluorescence in situ hybridization (FISH). 
[FISH) uses fluorescent molecules, called dyes, to "paint" genes on a chromosome. 
This technique is particularly useful for gene mapping and for detecting various chro-
mosomal abnormalities. In this procedure, short sequences of DNA complementary to 
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While both genomics and genetics have advanced, we do not have 
from either science complete and fully comprehensible maps of 
human beings, at either the species level or the individual level. The 
human genome is not entirely mapped and much of it is poorly under-
stood; obtaining and interpreting karotypes remains difficult. In fact, 
the same consortium behind the original Human Genome Project has 
just embarked on a $100 million project to produce a new kind of 
genomic map, one intended to "hasten discovery of the variant genes 
thought to underlie common human diseases like diabetes, asthma 
and cancer."107 
This is not to deny biomedical advances based on genomics. 
Prior to the development of the latest maps of the human genome, 
most sequencing and analysis technologies - the methods for devel-
oping chromosomal maps - were developed from studies of nonhu-
man genomes, notably those of the bacterium Escherichia coli, the 
yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae, the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster, 
the roundworm Caenorhabditis elegans, and the laboratory mouse 
Mus musculus ,108 A large amount of genetic information has already 
been derived from these organisms, providing valuable data for the 
analysis of normal human gene regulation, genetic diseases, and evo-
lutionary processes. For example, researchers have already identified 
single genes associated with a number of diseases, such as cystic fibro-
sis,l09 As research progresses, investigators hope to uncover the 
mechanisms for diseases caused by several genes, or by single genes 
interacting with environmental factors. 11o Genetic susceptibilities 
have been implicated in many major disabling and fatal diseases, in-
cluding heart disease, Alzheimer's, epilepsy, stroke, diabetes, and sev-
[d. 
the sequence of interest, called probes, are hybridized to the sample DNA. Because 
the probes are labeled with fluorescent tags, a researcher can see the exact location of 
the DNA sequence of interest on a chromosome. An additional advantage of FISH is 
that it can be performed on nondividing cells, making it much more versatile than tradi-
tional karyotyping. 
Scientists can actually create three types of FISH probes, each of which has a dif-
ferent application. Locus-specific probes hybridize to a particular region of a chromo-
some and are useful for detecting the location of a gene on a chromosome. Alphoid, or 
centromeric repeat probes, are generated from repetitive sequences found at the cen-
tromeres of chromosomes. Because each chromosome can be painted a different color, 
researchers use these probes to determine whether an individual has the correct num-
ber of chromosomes. Whole chromosome probes are actually collections of smaller 
probes, called libraries, that each hybridize to a different sequence along the same 
chromosome. Using these libraries, researchers can paint an entire chromosome with 
various colors, generating what is called a spectral karyotpye. These types of probes 
are useful for examining both large- and small-scale chromosomal abnormalities. 
107. Nicholas Wade, Gene-Mappers Take New Aim at Diseases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at 
A23. 
108. WADE, supra note 87, at 27. James D. Watson, one of the co-discoverers of the struc-
ture of DNA, encouraged the HGP to map these genomes. [d. 
109. RICHMOND, supra note 90, at 7. 
110. [d. at 6-10. 
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eral kinds of cancer.111 The identification of these genes and their 
proteins could pave the way to more effective therapies and preven-
tive measures.112 This is certainly the hope of pharmaceutical manu-
facturers hoping to capitalize on the advances in basic research in both 
genomics and genetics. Yet scientists still cannot reliably determine 
the genetic causes of most diseases, since most diseases are mul-
tigenic.113 Genuceuticals for most diseases remain elusive. 
V. TORTS WAITING TO HAPPEN 
Pharmaceutical companies are already positioned to gain a wide 
variety of information about the people who have consumed drugs 
prescribed by their physicians.114 Ironically, some of the impetus for 
drug manufacturers to keep track of at least the identities of the end 
users came from the famous tort litigation, Sindell v. Abbott Laborato-
ries,ll5 involving the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES).116 In Sindell, the 
California Supreme Court allowed each defendant's liability to be a 
rebuttable presumption: if a given defendant could prove that it was 
not the cause of a particular plaintiff's injuries, it would not be held 
liable.117 Furthermore, the court held the defendants severally liable; 
if one defendant was insolvent, the other named defendants would not 
be liable for the insolvent defendant's portion.118 So, Sindell permit-
ted a defendant to avoid paying any damages to a particular plaintiff, 
if it could prove it was not the company that had supplied DES to her 
mother, or to exonerate itself from paying some damages if it could 
show that the DES ingested by a plaintiff's mother was made by a now 
insolvent defendant. Presumably, one effect of the imposition of Cali-
111. [d. at 10. 
112. [d. at 12. 
113. The leaders of the consortium want to proceed with a new map due to difficulties in 
current methods of identifying the genetic bases of multigenic diseases. Wade, supra note 107, at 
A23. 
114. RICHMOND, supra note 90, at 60. 
115. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). 
116. In Sindell, the daughters of women who had taken DES sued all the major makers of 
the drug even though practically no injured plaintiff could identify which specific manufacturer 
had made the DES pills taken by her mother. Identification was impeded by the indist-
inguishability of the pills themselves and the lack of records kept by either pharmacies or drug 
companies as to which company's DES was prescribed to any particular patient. By the time the 
plaintiffs' injuries manifested, it was virtually impossible for them to identify the specific manu-
facturer of the drug taken by their respective mothers, but it was scientifically beyond question 
that DES caused serious medical injury to the plaintiffs. See id. at 925·27. The California Su-
preme Court adopted a theory of recovery called market-share liability, which permitted DES 
daughters to sue DES manufacturers and recover on a modified theory of joint and several 
liability. Sindell required the plaintiffs to name as defendants those manufacturers who were 
responsible for a substantial percentage of the DES market. See id. at 937. In addition, the 
court allowed each defendant's liability to be a rebuttable presumption: if a given defendant 
could prove that it was not the cause of a particular plaintiff's injuries, it would not be held 
liable. See id. For example, if evidence showed that the pills ingested by a given plaintiff's 
mother were pink, and a defendant's pills were white, the defendant could escape liability. 
117. See id. at 937-38. 
118. See id. at 938. 
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fornia-style market share liability has been to spur pharmaceutical 
companies to keep better records of the end-users of their products; 
also presumably, this has meant negotiating feedback from pharma-
cies who seek supply from drug companies. As pharmaceutical com-
panies gain genomic and genetic knowledge, they will be able to use 
this information to target people whose need for one drug suggests 
that they may have a predisposition for another health problem. This 
opens the field for highly personalized MDM of genuceuticals. 
It also creates the opportunity for the following sort of scenario, 
just one possible way MDM of genuceuticals can create a new or 
heightened climate of risk leading to physical injury. For the sake of 
argument, let us assume the following hypothetical situation. Suppose 
Neurontin turns out to have a hitherto unknown latent dangerous ef-
fect: it causes a genetic mutation in the sons of fathers or mothers 
who have ingested Neurontin. This mutation predisposes the male 
offspring of Neurontin-takers to a virulent form of testicular cancer. 
Having contracted this form of cancer, Emerson Whittaker (a fictional 
plaintiff) brings suit against Pfizer for negligent MDM of Neurontin. 
Whittaker's father Guillermo took Neurontin for ten years, up to, and 
including, the time Emerson was conceived. Because Guillermo suf-
fered from a neurological condition discovered to be genetically corre-
lated with migraine, and because Pfizer had access to Guillermo's 
pharmacy records, Pfizer sent Guillermo glossy mailers about Neuron-
tin, showing people who obviously were not suffering from migraine. 
Guillermo mentioned the mailer to his physician, Antonia Burrus, 
who had in fact been planning to suggest Neurontin to him for his 
migraine condition, in any event. Dr. Burrus was under contract to 
medical care organizations (MeG) controlled by Pfizer. In fact, she 
was among those identified by Pfizer as likely prescribers of Neuron-
tin for migraine, and she attended various Pfizer-sponsored confer-
ences at beachside resorts and received several honoraria for 
attending. 
Emerson does not have a cause of action for malpractice against 
his father's physician because the practice of prescribing Neurontin 
for migraine was extremely widespread at the time Guillermo took 
the drug.119 To recover for his injuries, Emerson must win a case 
against Pfizer. To prevail in a suit against Pfizer, Emerson must estab-
lish that Pfizer breached its duty120 to behave as a reasonable person 
119. The standard of care for physicians is set by custom and is the standard of medical care 
provided by fellow physicians in like circumstances. 
120. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 6 cm!. b 
(Tentative Draft No.2, 2002). 
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of ordinary prudence who acts with due care for the safety of 
others.121 
Emerson could point to the MDM of Neurontin to establish 
breach. He would argue that alternative, safer treatments for mi-
graine existed, but that Pfizer had created a demand for Neurontin for 
this indication and then met this demand. But note that Pfizer could 
defend itself. It may be that Pfizer could show that no alternative 
treatment had a better track record than Neurontin; Emerson, how-
ever, could well respond that MDM, particularly Pfizer's repeated ef-
forts to gain extended patent protection for Neurontin, created an 
unreasonable barrier to entry for companies that might have invested 
in treatments for migraine. . 
Pfizer would be much better positioned to defend itself against 
Emerson's claim of breach if it had not engaged in such heavy duty 
MDM for Neurontin. Not every drug is pushed as hard as Neurontin. 
Additionally, Pfizer could have engaged in measures to offset the ar-
guably excessive risk created by its MDM of Neurontin. For example, 
Pfizer itself could have worked to develop alternative treatments for 
migraine. 
My point here is not to construct every possible support for or 
defense to a claim of negligent MDM. Nor is my goal to explore all 
the elements of a negligence action alleging tortious MDM of Neuron-
tin. This brief hypothetical simply illustrates how a drug company can 
engage in MDM as a person of ordinary caution and prudence, with 
due regard for the safety of others, or it can fail to do so. If cogent 
legal arguments can be brought to bear on this issue, then a cause of 
action for negligent pharmaceutical MDM poses no special difficulties 
for courts to administer. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The symposium for which this article was written has as its theme 
"genetics and ethics in the courtroom." My paper challenges the 
American judiciary to accept the ethical responsibility of developing a 
cause of action that addresses risk created by advances in the sciences 
of genetics and genomics as these advances are put to use by pharma-
ceutical manufacturers. Without such a cause of action, conduct likely 
to create significant risk of personal injury will go legally unchecked. 
This raises immediate issues of corrective justice. But permitting or 
denying such a cause of action has deeper ethical dimensions. Permit-
ting negligence actions against pharmaceutical manufacturers when 
they engage in conduct that, at least arguably, unduly increases the 
121. See id. § 6(b) ("[A)n actor whose failure to exercise reasonable care is a factual cause of 
physical harm is subject to liability for any such harm within the scope of liability."). 
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climate of risk says something about how these manufacturers should 
act when merchandising their wares. How persons (natural or fic-
tional) should act, whether they should be accountable for their ac-
tions, and if so, to whom, and in what manner - these are 
quintessential ethical concerns. 
With the completion of the government-sponsored Human Gen-
ome Project and the corporation Celera's private effort to map the 
human genome, much of the basic research is in place for the develop-
ment of a new generation of pharmaceuticals. Scientists anticipate 
that increased knowledge of genomics in general, together with in-
creases in specific information about an individual person's genetic 
make-up, will enable the invention of drugs that either act at the mo-
lecular genetic level directly, or which specifically target genetically 
identifiable diseases and address them via biochemical mechanisms 
tailored to that level. Were such drugs available, safe, and effective, 
so much the better. While we can definitely expect their availability, 
we have much less reason to expect them to be safe and effective, 
especially in the first generation of gene-specific pharmaceuticals. 
Furthermore, not only should we expect that pharmaceutical compa-
nies will make available gene-specific drugs that pose undue risk, we 
should anticipate that pharmaceutical companies will engage in mas-
sive, systematic efforts to coordinate the design, manufacturing, mar-
keting, and distribution of these drugs to end users - patients. Thus, 
the stage is set for a new round of pharmaceutically induced injuries. 
Due to political and economic realities, the FDA and other ad-
ministrative bodies are unlikely safeguards against this round of mass 
injury. The tort system will be called upon to play its traditional role 
in correcting wrongful injuries caused by pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers, with the side effect of deterring continuing causation of exces-
sively risky drug development and distribution. Yet the tort system is 
not ready to handle the types and volume of injuries that can be ex-
pected from the market-driven manufacturing of gene-specific 
pharmaceuticals. To get ready, jurists and commentators need to un-
derstand and appreciate the scientific and financial forces behind the 
potentially tortious behavior of pharmaceutical companies; modern 
methods of development and distribution of drugs; the gaps in current 
tort law that reduce its effectiveness in the face of these facts; and the 
ethical and legal issues at stake. 
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